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I. OVERVIEW OF HYDRAULIc DISCRETION AND
DETERMINATE SENTENCING
Numerous reform activities have been undertaken to minimize
discretion within the criminal justice system. Yet, the success of
these programs has been questioned on the grounds that discretion
will simply resurface at stages of processing not covered by the re-
form effort.' In fact, this "hydraulic" or "zero-sum" effect is so
firmly entrenched as a criticism of current reform efforts that most
researchers begin with the assumption that the displacement of dis-
* The author would like to thank Charles A. Moore for helpful comments on this
manuscript. The research reported here is part of a larger study on the Minnesota Sen-
tencing Guidelines funded by the National Institute ofJustice (Grant Number NIJ-85-IJ-
CY-0054). Points of view stated in this document are those of the author and do not
represent the official position or policies of the United States Department ofJustice.
* Assistant Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Ph.D.,
Washington State University, 1982; M.A., Western Washington University, 1978; B.A.,
Western Washington State College, 1976.
1 See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals
for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1978); Casper & Brer-
eton, Evaluating Criminal Justice Reforms, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 121 (1984); Coffee &
Tonry, Hard Choices: Critical Trade-offs in the Implementation of Sentencing Reform Through
Guidelines, in REFORM AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING 155 (M. Tonry
& F. Zimring eds. 1983); Church, Plea-Bargains, Concessions and the Courts: Analysis of a
Quasi-Experiment, 10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 377 (1976); Heumann & Loftin, Mandatory Sentenc-




cretion exists and then proceed to describe the various adaptive re-
sponses to such structural changes. 2
Although applied to all reforms directed at a particular compo-
nent of the criminal justice system (e.g., bail reform, bans on plea
bargaining, mandatory sentencing), the national movement toward
determinate sentencing is considered the primary example of a re-
form effort that will have its intended goals circumvented by the hy-
draulic displacement of discretion. While reflecting various
interests and concerns,3 determinate sentencing is designed to
achieve uniform sanctions and minimize socio-economic disparities
which may result from a system of unbridled judicial discretion.
Yet, most extant and proposed determinate sentencing systems
have ignored prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargain-
ing practices. 4 If, however, this "hydraulic effect" characterizes de-
terminate sentencing, gains in sentencing neutrality and uniformity
would be eroded by greater disparities in the use of prosecutorial
discretion in charging and plea bargaining practices. Under such
conditions, the ability of determinate sentencing to achieve its in-
tended goals and to implement meaningful reform would be se-
verely challenged.
Considering its common reference as a criticism of determinate
sentencing,5 it is surprising that little empirical research has ex-
amined whether this presumed hydraulic effect occurs and, if so,
whether it has altered the nature and determinants of prosecutorial
charging and plea bargaining practices. In fact, most researchers
have assumed either that any increase in the use of plea bargaining
in post-guideline periods is attributable to displacement effects or
that a backward transference of discretion to prosecutors and other
officials is simply an inevitable consequence of determinate sentenc-
2 See Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, Discretion and the Determinate Sentence: Its Distribution, Con-
trol, and Effect on Time Served, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 428 (1978); Heumann & Loftin, supra
note 1; McCoy, Determinate Sentencing, Plea Bargaining Bans, and Hydraulic Discretion in Cali-
fornia, 9 THE JUST. Sys. J. 256 (1984); S. Verdun-Jones & D. Cousineau, The Impact of
Plea-Bargaining Upon the Implementation of Sentencing Reform (November 13-16,
1985) (unpublished manuscript).
3 See A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING:
THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (1983); Miethe & Moore, Socioeconomic Disparities Under Determi-
nate Sentencing Systems: A Comparison of Preguideline and Postguideline Practices in Minnesota, 23
CRIMINOLOGY 337 (1985); Von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America:
An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINO. 289 (1981).
4 See A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, supra note 3; Alschuler, supra
note 1; McCoy, supra note 2; S. Verdun-Jones & D. Cousineau, supra note 2.
5 See Coffee & Tonry, supra note 1; F. ZIMRING, MAKING THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE
CRIME (1977); Alschuler, supra note 1; Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, supra note 2; McCoy, supra
note 2; S. Verdun-Jones & D. Cousineau, supra note 2.
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ing.6 Contrary to this conventional wisdom, however, several fac-
tors may actually limit the displacement of discretion and socio-
economic biases even when sentencing guidelines do not explicitly
regulate prosecutorial practices.
While prosecutors may acquire greater discretionary power
under determinate sentencing, their use of discretion is initially con-
strained by rules of law (e.g., evidentiary requirements) and working
relationships with other members of the criminal justice community.
For example, participation and membership in a "courthouse sub-
culture" 7  serves as a structural constraint on unbridled
prosecutorial discretion in initial charging and plea bargaining prac-
tices. In fact, daily working relationships with judges and public de-
fenders exert some control over prosecutorial practices even in the
absence of legal compulsion. On the other hand, prosecutors may
believe that regulating judicial discretion is an initial step in revamp-
ing the entire criminal justice system. Perceptions of subsequent
control over their own discretionary power, as well as public toler-
ance for various actions, may futher limit the greater use of
prosecutorial discretion after the passage of sentencing guidelines.
The hydraulic effect also may not characterize post-guideline
practices because of the modicum of control over judicial discretion
exercised under most determinate sentencing systems. For in-
stance, most determinate sentencing systems have followed a volun-
tary and descriptive approach to constructing and implementing
guidelines." Because there is no legal mandate to ensure compli-
ance with voluntary guidelines and because descriptive guidelines
are typically based on average sentences in the past, one would ex-
pect few changes over previous practices9 and little impetus for the
6 See Alschuler, supra note 1; Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, supra note 2; McCoy, supra note
2. Aside from enhancing prosecutors' discretion, the hydraulic analogy suggests that
other officials (such as the police) may also receive greater discretionary power. Because
our interest is in pretrial decisions for felony cases before and after determinate sentenc-
ing is imposed, we characterized this "zero-sum" tradeoff in terms of reducing judicial
discretion and enhancing prosecutorial discretion. A "trickle down" displacement of
discretion to police seems more applicable to misdemeanor cases, but it is unlikely in
felony cases. While this study examines prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea
bargaining decisions, the structural and informal controls on unbridled use of discretion
discussed later are also relevant to reform efforts directed at other types of discretion
and other stages of criminal processing.
7 A. RosETr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE By CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE AMERICAN
COURTHOUSE 91 (1976).
8 See Miethe & Moore, supra note 3; Von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 3.
9 In fact, the inability of determinate sentencing systems to achieve their explicit
goals has been attributed to the fact that most extant guidelines have followed this vol-
untary and descriptive approach. See generally A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M.
TONRY, supra note 3; Miethe & Moore, supra note 3.
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deflection of judicial discretion to prosecutors. Furthermore, even
under most presumptive guidelines, judges still retain enormous
discretion because the range of sentence durations is extremely
wide and the decision to stay or execute a prison sentence is usually
unregulated. Thus, considering the informal mechanisms of social
control and the limited control over judicial discretion, major
changes in charging and plea bargaining decisions may not typify
post-guideline practices.
The felony sentencing guidelines developed in the State of
Minnesota, however, are unique in several respects. First, the Min-
nesota guidelines have been largely successful in achieving their
goals of uniformity, neutrality and proportionality of punishment
within the constraints of available correctional resources. 10 Second,
in comparison to other systems, the Minnesota guidelines exert far
more control over judicial discretion, both by imposing a fairly re-
strictive range on the presumptive sentence duration and by regu-
lating the "in/out" decision (e.g., whether to stay or execute a
prison sentence). Furthermore, the Minnesota guidelines consider
only two factors for dispositional and durational decisions: the se-
verity of the convicted offense and the offender's prior criminal rec-
ord. All other factors are explicitly prohibited as a basis for
sentencing decisions governed by the guidelines." Due to their
rigid control over judicial discretion and the absence of control over
prosecutorial discretion, 12 the Minnesota guidelines should exhibit
clear signs of circumvention if the hydraulic effect characterizes re-
form policies directed at reducing only one type of discretion.
Previous evaluations of the Minnesota guidelines, however, re-
10 For review, see MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF
THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984) [hereinafter
MSGCI; Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished, 68JUDI-
CATURE 181 (1984); Miethe & Moore, supra note 3; Moore & Miethe, Regulated and Unreg-
ulated Sentencing Decisions: An Analysis of First-Year Practices Under Minnesota's Felony
Sentencing Guidelines, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 253 (1986).
11 See MSGC, supra note 10; Moore & Miethe, supra note 10.
12 While prosecutorial guidelines on charging and plea bargaining practices have
been considered in Minnesota, such guidelines on a state-wide basis have not, as of yet,
been implemented. See MSGC, supra note 10. Several counties, however, have instituted
various types of plea negotiation policies independent of the sentencing guidelines. In
fact, a survey of county attorneys (prosecutors) revealed that 62% of the counties in
Minnesota had informal and unwritten plea negotiation policies, whereas only 9% have
formal policies regarding plea bargaining. The remaining 29% of the counties have no
articulated policies on plea negotiations. See MSGC, supra note 10, at 86. While these
policies are not uniform across the state and vary considerably in terms of degree of self-
imposed compliance, written plea negotiation p 6 licies are more prevalent in the larger,
metropolitan county offices (including Minneapolis and St. Paul) than in the more rural
counties of the state. See MSGC, supra note 10, at 86.
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veal few signs of circumvention through non-regulated
prosecutorial practices. For instance, Miethe and Moore1 3 report
that overall models of charge bargaining and sentence negotiations
differed significantly over time, but socio-economic differentiation
in the type of persons receiving plea concessions remained at its
pre-guideline level. However, because adaptive responses to struc-
tural changes slowly evolve through time,14 the analysis of only
first-year practices in that study may be problematic because the
time frame is too close to guideline implementation.' 5 On the other
hand, the Commission's report' 6 reveals that overall rates of sen-
tence bargaining have decreased over post-guideline time periods
and charge reductions were more common among cases located
near the line demarcating whether the presumptive disposition is a
stayed or executed prison sentence. This latter study, however, did
not examine whether these changes were more common among par-
ticular configurations of felony offenders. Consequently, it cannot
address whether social differentiation in plea negotiation practices
was enhanced in post-guideline time periods. While previous evalu-
ations indicate some temporal changes in plea bargaining practices,
they are limited in their ability to address the extent to which the
hydraulic effect has circumvented the intent of the guidelines by in-
creasing socio-economic disparities in charging and plea bargaining
practices.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
If the hydraulic effect is a logical consequence of determinate
sentencing systems which limit judicial discretion but do not directly
regulate prosecutorial discretion, major differences in the nature
and determinants of prosecutorial practices should be observed
over pre- and post-guideline time periods. First, although insuffi-
cient evidence for the claim that displaced discretion has under-
13 Miethe & Moore, supra note 3, at 355-57.
14 See generally A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, supra note 3; Casper
& Brereton, supra note 1; Heumann & Loftin, supra note 1.
15 In addition to being restricted to first-year practices, the previous study of plea
bargaining practices under the Minnesota guidelines by Miethe and Moore is also lim-
ited because different types of charge bargaining were combined in the same index.
Specifically, their measure of charge bargaining included both charge reductions and
charge dismissals. If the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction or charge dismissal is
determined by different case and offender atttributes, however, including both measures
of charge bargaining in the same index may suppress the degree of socio-economic dif-
ferentiation observed in their comparisons of pre- and post-guideline practices. In the
present study, each of these types of charge bargaining will be analyzed separately.
16 See MSGC, supra note 10, at 78-79.
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mined the guidelines' intent, 17 overall rates of charge bargaining
and sentence negotiations' 8 should be higher in post-guideline peri-
ods if prosecutors are using their greater discretionary power to en-
tice defendants into guilty pleas. Second, if the hydraulic effect
undermines the goals of sentencing neutrality and uniformity
through greater differentiation in the type of person who receives
plea concessions, measures of the felon's social profile (e.g., sex,
race, unemployment status, marital status) should more accurately
predict charging and plea bargaining practices in post-guideline pe-
riods. Thus, the hydraulic theory of discretion would be supported
if overall plea bargaining rates increased and offender characteris-
tics were given greater importance in these decisions after imple-
mention of the sentencing guidelines. Finally, if adaptive responses
to structural changes evolve through time,' 9 differences in the na-
ture and determinants of prosecutorial practices should be more
pronounced during the second year than the first year of the Minne-
sota sentencing guidelines.
17 An increase in types of plea bargaining in post-guideline time periods is not a
sufficient condition for the inference that displaced discretion has undermined the in-
tent of the sentencing guidelines for several reasons. First, increases in overall rates of
plea bargaining, rather than being due to displacement per se, may be attributable to a
general rise in the crime rate in post-guideline periods which may require greater use of
plea-bargaining for relieving case pressure. On the other hand, even if the overall rates
of plea bargaining did not increase over post-guideline periods, the "hydraulic effect"
may still be operative if prosecutors are more likely to enter plea agreements for some
types of crimes, but less likely to enter them for other types of crime. In fact, upon
closer examination, whether or not overall changes in rates of plea bargaining have oc-
curred over time is of little relevance to the claim of displaced discretion and its conse-
quences on the ability of sentencing guidelines to achieve their goals. Specifically, to
support the claim that hydraulic discretion has circumvented the goals of sentencing
neutrality and uniformity, it must be shown that greater socio-economic differentiation
has occurred in plea bargaining practices over time. While one might expect overall
rates of plea bargaining to increase after the imposition of sentencing guidelines, the
critical question examined here is whether prosecutors are using their greater discre-
tionary power in a manner which enhances socio-economic biases in plea bargaining
and, in turn, undermines the explicit goals of the sentencing guidelines.
18 The Minnesota guidelines reduce the likelihood of a sentence concession for those
offenders whose presumptive disposition is an executed prison sentence. For these
felons (approximately 20% of all convicted felons), there is little to be gained from a
sentence concession because the guidelines largely determine the type of sentence and
the duration of confinement. See MSGC, supra note 10, at 85; Miethe & Moore, supra
note 3, at 351. There are few restrictions, however, on the type and length of confine-
ment for those felons who receive a "stayed" prison term because sentencing guidelines
have not yet been developed for the majority of offenders in Minnesota whose presump-
tive disposition is a non-prison sentence. Consequently, one would expect a slight de-
crease in the overall rates of sentence concessions, but an increase in such bargains on
the type and length of sentence for those felons who received a stayed prison term.
19 See, e.g., A. BLUMSTEIN, J. COHEN, S. MARTIN & M. TONRY, supra note 3; Casper &
Brereton, supra note 1.
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II. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
The data for this study was originally collected by the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines Commission as part of their evaluation
of felony sentencing practices. 20 Samples of felons convicted in dis-
trict courts in Minnesota were selected for the fiscal year 1978 (two
years before the guidelines), the first eighteen months under the
guidelines (May 1, 1980 to October 1, 1981) and for an additional
twelve month period (October, 1981 to September, 1982). For pur-
poses of convenience, the labels 1978, 1980 and 1982 are used to
refer to the respective samples.
While each sample was stratifed by gender, the post-guideline
samples were further stratified by race, county and disposition (in-
cluding all executed prison sentences in the state in 1980 but only
executed prison sentences in the eight most populous urban and
rural counties in 1982). Random samples of felons who received
stayed prison sentences in 1980 and 1982 were drawn only from
these eight counties, whereas a state-wide sample was used for cases
processed in 1978. To increase the comparability of the samples,
only felony cases processed in the eight counties are analyzed in the
present study. While limiting generalizations about state-wide prac-
tices, over 60% of all felony cases in Minnesota are processed in this
eight county region. Because disproportionate stratified sampling
was used in each sample, a weighting factor was applied to each stra-
tum so that the samples more accurately represent the respective
populations. After applying these weights, a sample readjustment
was performed so that the original weighting procedure did not arti-
ficially inflate the sample sizes.21
The original eight county samples consisted of 1,450, 1,453,
and 1,819 felony cases, respectively. The sample sizes were re-
duced, however, because of the decision to exclude cases that con-
tained missing data on any major variable in this study. Even
though this decision resulted in a moderate loss of cases for each
year (12%, 6% and 4%, respectively), a comparison of the original
and base samples revealed that missing data were excluded without
loss of generality. Thus, the analysis presented below is based on
1,273, 1,369, and 1,738 convicted felons who were processed in the
eight counties during the respective pre- and post-guideline time
periods.
20 For a more complete description of the data, see MSGC, supra note 10, at 19-20.
21 For a more complete discussion of this weighting procedure and the limitations of
the samples, see Miethe & Moore, supra note 3, at 346.
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III. COMPARISON OF VARIABLES OVER TIME PERIODS
A summary of the variables included in this study, the coding of
the variables, and the descriptive statistics for each time period is
provided in Table 1. The variables are grouped into two general
categories: endogenous (dependent) variables and exogenous (in-
dependent) variables.
The endogenous variables refer to charging and plea bargain-
ing practices that are of ultimate interest in this study. The major
charging variable examined here is the severity of the most serious
alleged charge initially filed by the prosecutor (ALEGSEV). This va-
riable was measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (e.g., pos-
session of marijuana) to 10 (2nd degree murder). The ranking of
crimes on this scale is identical to the index developed by the Min-
nesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to measure the severity
of the convicted offense. 22
The endogenous variables also include measures of the two
most common types of plea bargaining: charge bargaining and sen-
tence bargaining. Charge bargaining was operationalized in terms
of whether any of the three most serious charges were either dis-
missed (CHARDISM) or reduced (CHREDUCE) as part of the plea
agreement. While sometimes collapsed into a single measure of
charge bargaining,23 charge dismissals yield greater concessions
than charge reductions because consecutive sentencing may be in-
applicable in the former case, but may still be possible in the
latter.2 4
Sentence bargaining was measured in terms of whether there
was a plea agreement on either the type of sentence or the length of
confinement to be served. A sentence concession (PBSENT) was
noted if any of the three most serious charges involved one of the
following types of plea agreements: limited or no initial jail time for
those receiving a stayed prison term, a stay of imposition rather than
a stay of execution of the sentence, "standing silent" as to the type
22 For a complete list of offenses included in each category, see MSGC, supra note 10,
at 157-59.
23 See, e.g., Miethe & Moore, supra note 3, at 347.
24 It is also true that when a charge reduction is granted as part of a plea agreement
the felon may be convicted for separate "behavioral incidents" since the charges are still
retained. When separate behavioral incidents are charged, judges can sentence the de-
fendant separately for each incident and, thus, consecutively increase the felon's crimi-
nal history score. For a discussion, see MSGC, supra note 10, at 71. Because charge
reductions may still result in consecutive sentences and an increase in the felon's crimi-
nal history score for separate behavioral incidents, a charge reduction is not only a less
important concession than a charge dismissal, but these two types of charge bargaining
may also be explained by different case and offender attributes.
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TABLE 1
VARIABLES, CODING AND SUMMARY MEASURES BY YEAR
MEAN OR PERCENT
(STANDARD DEVIATIONS)
VARIABLE CODES 1978 1980 1982
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or length of sentence, concurrent rather than consecutive sentences
for multiple charges, and/or a reduction of a felony sentence to
gross misdemeanor sentence. While measures of charge bargaining
and sentence negotiations are interrelated, they are treated here as
separate measures so that the analysis is sensitive to specific changes
in the nature and types of plea negotiations. However, an overall














































































































and sentence negotiations (PLEABARG) is also included as an en-
dogenous variable to detect changes in the extent and determinants
of plea bargaining over time periods.2 5
The exogenous variables refer to sets of offense, case process-
ing and offender attributes that are expected to influence whether a
felon receives a particular type of plea bargaining concession. In
addition to the severity of the most serious alleged offense, offense
characteristics include whether a dangerous weapon was used in the
crime (DANGWEAP), whether the crime involved multiple offend-
ers (MULTOFFS), the total number of separate behavioral incidents
noted in the initial charges (NOFFENSE)26 and whether the case
bordered the dispositional line such that a one-point reduction in
either the severity of the alleged offense or the offender's criminal
history would result in a presumptive "stayed" disposition (BE-
LOW1). This latter variable was included to determine if post-
guideline plea bargaining practices were more common among
cases that straddled the "in/out" dispositional line.2 7
The major case processing variable examined here was the
county of adjudication. Previous evaluations of the Minnesota
guidelines revealed major differences in charging and plea negotia-
tion practices by county. 28 As a result, jurisdictional differences
were coded in such a way to compare cases processed in Hennepin
County (Minneapolis) and Ramsey County (St. Paul) with the other
six included counties. Finally, offender attributes included the
25 The overall measure of plea bargaining (PLEABARG) is included primarily for
heuristic purposes. As shown later, combining all items into a single scale of "plea bar-
gaining" is misleading because each type of plea bargaining (CHARDISM, CHREDUCE,
PBSENT) is explained by different offense, case-processing and offender attributes.
Also, it is important to note that the percentage of felons who received a plea bargain
does not equal the sum of the separate measures of charge dismissal, charge reduction
and sentence concessions because some defendants received both charge and sentence
bargains. Although not shown in Table 1, the percentage of felons in 1978, 1980 and
1982 who received both charge and sentence bargains were 21.4%, 15.3%o and 17.5%
respectively.
26 "Separate behavioral incidents" refer to cases in which a series of separate of-
fenses were committed over a particular time period, across different jurisdictions, or
involving different victims. See MSGC, supra note 10, at 71-79. A series of convictions
for separate behavioral incidents could increase the defendant's criminal history score to
a level in which the presumptive disposition becomes an executed prison term; thus, the
number of alleged behavioral incidents is a crucial consideration, as well as a major
enticement, for entering a guilty plea under the Minnesota guidelines. See supra note 24
and accompanying text. By exercising their legal authority to retain multiple charges
against a defendant, prosecutors can also "target the dispositional line" and determine
whether the presumptive sentence is a stayed or executed prison term through the
number of separate behavioral incidents carried over to final disposition.
27 See also MSGC, supra note 10, at 81-85.
28 See MSGC, supra note 10, at 72-86; Miethe & Moore, supra note 3.
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felon's criminal history score, race, sex, marital status and whether
or not the offender was employed at the time of the offense. To
assess whether particular configurations of offenders are less likely
to be given plea concessions, a composite measure of the offender's
demographic profile was also constructed (SOCDANG). This mea-
sure compares individuals whose demographic profile fits the stere-
otypical image of a "high risk" or "dangerous" offender (e.g., male,
non-white, single and unemployed) with all other demographic
profiles.
A comparison of the summary statistics in Table 1 reveals few
overall changes in charging and plea bargaining practices over pre-
and post-guideline time periods. For instance, rates of charge re-
ductions decreased slightly over time, whereas charge dismissals
were slightly more common in 1982 than during any other time pe-
riod. Sentence negotiations and overall rates of plea bargaining de-
creased in post-guideline periods, but these trends were especially
apparent in 1980. On the other hand, there was little change over
time in the average severity of the initial charge.
A closer examination of the types of cases which received plea
agreements also revealed few changes over time. For instance,
charge dismissals were far more likely at each time period for felons
charged with multiple behavioral incidents than single behavioral
incidents. Similarly, regardless of time period, charge reductions
were about three times more likely for offenders whose sever-
ity/history combination placed them below the dispositional line
(e.g., felons whose presumptive disposition on conviction would
have been a prison sentence). Sentence concessions, however, were
far more likely for offenders above this dispositional line at each
time period. 29 Thus, contrary to expectations based on the claims
of displaced discretion, the overall trends reported here and in Ta-
ble 1 suggest that prosecutors' charging and plea bargaining prac-
tices remained fairly stable across pre- and post-guideline periods.
IV. MODELING CHANGES IN CHARGING AND
PLEA BARGAINING PRACTICES
Time-specific models for initial charging practices and each
type of plea bargaining were estimated to examine whether the de-
terminants of these dispositional decisions had changed over time.
Chow tests for the equality of a set of coefficients were performed to
determine if time-specific models exist for each dispositional deci-
29 These analyses are not presented here but are available from the author upon
request.
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sion. To reduce the likelihood of a type I error, the hypothesis of
identical models over time was rejected if the observed probability
of obtaining such an outcome was less than .01 (p< .01). The spe-
cific variables that contributed to the time-specific models were
found by re-estimating the models when all two-way interaction be-
tween time and the other exogenous variables were included in the
equations. 30 The time-specific models for initial charging and plea
bargaining practices are presented in Tables 2 through 4.
A. MODELS OF INITIAL CHARGING PRACTICES
One of the primary ways in which the Minnesota sentencing
guidelines could be circumvented is through greater socio-eco-
nomic differentiation in initial charges filed by the prosecutor. Spe-
cifically, if particular social groups (such as males, blacks, unmarried
or unemployed persons) are charged initially with more severe of-
fenses after passage of the guidelines, these changes in initial charg-
ing practices would undermine the goals of uniformity and greater
socio-economic neutrality in sentencing decisions.3 1 The results of
estimating the time-specific models for the severity of the initial
charge are provided in Table 2.
While several variables exhibited time-specific effects, the overall
models of initial charging practices were not significantly different
30 Chow tests are commonly used in the econometric literature to test the equality of
a set of coefficients across models. These tests are used here to evaluate the hypothesis
that the overall models for initial charging and each type of plea bargaining are identical
over pre- and post-guideline periods. A "significant" Chow test implies that the overall
models are significantly different at the two time periods. After determining that the
overall models are different, regression models with all two-way interactions between
time and other attributes are estimated to locate those particular offense, case and of-
fender characteristics that contribute to these time-specific models. For an application
of these tests to comparable research questions, see Miethe & Moore, supra note 3;
Miethe & Moore, Racial Differences in Criminal Processing: The Consequences of Model Selection
on Conclusions About Diferential Treatment, 17 THE SOC. Q. 217 (1986).
Ordinary least squares (OLS) was used to estimate the models of charging and plea
bargaining practices at each time period. OLS regression has some well-known
problems when the dependent variable is dichotomous. Yet, a sizeable body of research
suggests that comparable results between OLS and other estimation techniques (such as
Probit and Logit) are observed when the samples are large and the distribution of scores
is less extreme than 75% and 25% in the respective categories. See Miethe & Moore,
supra note 3, at 350. Although not shown here, Probit and Logit models were also esti-
mated for each of the measures of plea bargaining. The results from these analyses were
generally quite similar to those reported in the body of the paper. The relative size of
the coefficients were similar across these alternative specifications and there was no in-
crease in socio-economic differentiation after passage of the guidelines. Thus, the OLS
results are presented here without loss of generality.
31 On the other hand, greater social differentiation in the severity of initial charges
could also be due to the fact that particular groups of individuals are simply committing
more "serious" crimes in post-guideline time periods.
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TABLE 2
UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR TIME-SPECIFIC
MODELS OF THE SEVERITY OF INITIAL CHARGE
ALEGSEV









































R 2=  .343
Chow Tests:
1978-80: F=1.985, ns (d.f.=12,2629)
1978-82: F=1.704, ns (d.f.=12,2998)


























































See the text for a discussion of the variables.
b The standard errors are in parentheses ( ).
* Significant coefficient for time-specific model at p<.05; **p<.0l.
+ Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of
1978 and 1980 models at p<.05; ++p<.01.
# Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of
1978 and 1982 models at p<.05; ##p<.Ol.
over pre- and post-guideline time periods. Regardless of time pe-
riod, felons who were male, used dangerous weapons and allegedly
participated in multiple behavioral incidents (NOFFENSE) were ini-
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tially charged with more serious offenses than their counterparts.
The use of a dangerous weapon had a less pronounced effect, how-
ever, in 1980 than was true in 1978, whereas sex differences in the
severity of the initial charge were greater in 1982 than in 1978. Less
serious charges were also filed in Ramsey County than the other
counties in 1980, but no significant differences between Ramsey and
the other counties were observed in 1978 and 1982. Although the
time-specific contrasts were not statistically significant, blacks and
other racial minorities (in comparison to white felons) were particu-
larly likely to be charged with more serious offenses in 1982. How-
ever, the lack of major changes over time in the predictors of the
severity of the initial charge is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
sentencing guidelines strongly influence the nature and determi-
nants of non-regulated charging practices.
B. MODELS OF PLEA BARGAINING PRACTICES
Major changes in the determinants of charge bargaining and
sentence negotiations also would be expected if the hydraulic effect
results in discretion being displaced to prosecutors and greater
socio-economic disparities in non-regulated decisions. Offender
characteristics should also have a stronger impact on plea bargain-
ing decisions in 1982 than in 1980 if adaptive responses to struc-
tural change evolve slowly through time. As shown in Tables 3 and
4, however, these predictors were generally not supported. While
pre-guideline models of charge dismissals, charge reductions and
sentence concessions were significantly different than their post-
guideline counterparts, these time-specific models were primarily
due to the differential importance given to case processing and of-
fense attributes, rather than offender characteristics. Furthermore,
a comparison of the overall models for each type of plea bargaining
in 1980 and 1982 revealed few differences across post-guideline pe-
riods, suggesting that major adaptive responses to the sentencing
guidelines did not evolve through time.3 2
As shown in Table 3, charge dismissals were more common
32 Tables 3 and 4 do not identify those time-specific effects which were statistically
different between 1980 and 1982. These time-specific effects were excluded because the
overall models for most of the measures of charging and plea bargaining practices (ex-
cept PBSENT and PLEABARG) were found to be not significantly different at each post-
guideline time period. Although they were not specifically identified, one can determine
those variables which exhibit different effects in 1980 and 1982 by comparing the rela-
tive sizes and direction of the unstandardized regression coefficients for the post-guide-
line models provided in these tables. Aside from being few in number, most of the
"significant" differences between 1980 and 1982 practices are due to the differential
effects of offense (e.g., weapon use) and case attributes (e.g., county differences). In
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each year for offenders who were charged with multiple offenses and
processed in Ramsey County. Regardless of time period, measures
of the offender's demographic profile had little net impact on this
type of plea agreement. The time-specific models of charge dismis-
sals were due to the differential importance placed on offense and
case-processing variables at post-guideline time periods. Specifi-
cally, the number of alleged offenses became less important in post-
guideline practices, whereas county differentiation was greater in
both post-guideline periods. Post-guideline felons processed in
Ramsey County were far more likely to have charges dismissed,
whereas offenders processed in Hennepin County were less likely
than their counterparts to receive a charge dismissal in post-guide-
line periods. Furthermore, pre-guideline felons charged with using
a dangerous weapon were more likely to gain a charge dismissal, but
in 1982 these felons tended to be less likely to gain a charge dismis-
sal than persons who did not use a dangerous weapon.
The time-specific models for charge reductions were also due
primarily to the differential importance given to offense and case
processing attributes in post-guideline time periods. As shown in
Table 3, the impact of the severity of the initial charge, multiple of-
fenders and processing in Ramsey County on the likelihood of
charge reductions was less pronounced in both post-guideline peri-
ods. Furthermore, pre-guideline differentiation based on weapon
use diminished in 1982, whereas the pre-guideline tendency for
cases that straddled the dispositional line (BELOWI) to gain charge
reductions was eliminated in 1980. Although employment status
had no significant effect at any time period, charge reductions were
also slightly more common among employed than unemployed
felons before passage of the guidelines, but an opposite trend was
observed in 1982.
The time-specific models of sentence concessions and overall
plea agreements are shown in Table 4. The time-specific models of
sentence concessions are largely due to the differential importance
given to the county of processing and measures of the offender's
demographic profile. Specifically, pre-guideline felons processed in
Ramsey County were far more likely to receive a sentence conces-
sion than those in other counties, whereas post-guideline felons
processed in the urban counties (Hennepin or Ramsey County)
were far less likely to be given such plea concessions. On the other
hand, the felon's employment status had no discernable impact on
contrast to expectations, there were few signs of greater social differentiation in plea
bargaining practices in 1982 than in 1980.
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TABLE 3
UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR TIME-SPECIFIC







ALEGSEV .012 .019"* .014* .042** .025**+ .027**#
(.0 08)b (.007) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.004)
HISTORY -.008 -. 005 -.015" -.014" -. 009 .000
(.009) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.004)
NOFFENSE .125"* .077**++ .071"*## -. 027** -. 013" -. 020**
(.012) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.006) (.005)
BELOWI -. 018 .031 .001 .082* -. 001 + .024
(.046) (.039) (.035) (.033) (.025) (.021)
MULTOFF .063 .025 .066** .031 -. 001 + -. 026 ##
(.026) (.026) (.023) (.018) (.016) (.014)
DANGWEAP .103"* .057 -. 054 ## .093** .066** .008 #
(.046) (.041) (.040) (.032) (.026) (.024)
HENNCO .008 -. 120"*++ -. 078"*# .049* .013 .036
(.031) (.029) (.027) (.022) (.018) (.016)
RAMCO .143"* .257**+ .374**## .095** -. 009 ++ -. 033* ##
(.034) (.032) (.028) (.024) (.020) (.016)
MALE .105"* .010 .058 .015 -.013 .017
(.038) (.038) (.032) (.027) (.024) (.019)
SINGLE -. 029 -. 023 -. 007 -. 018 .029 -. 031









Constant -. 050 .092
(.057) (.056)
N= 1273 1369







































a See the text for a discussion of the variables.
, The standard errors are in parentheses 0.
* Significant coefficient for time-specific model at p<.05; **p<.01.
+ Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of 1978
and 1980 models at p<.05; ++p<.O.
# Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of 1978













1987] CHARGING AND PLEA BARGAINING PRACTICES 171
sentence concessions before the guidelines, but unemployed felons
were less likely than their employed counterparts to gain a sentence
concession in post-guideline time periods. Furthermore, pre-guide-
line felons whose social profile fit the stereotypical image of being
"dangerous" were far less likely than other offenders to receive a
sentence concession, but this variable had no significant impact on
post-guideline practices.
Finally, while the explanatory power of the models was minimal
at each time period, several common and time-specific effects were
observed when models of the likelihood of gaining any type of plea
concession were estimated. As shown in Table 4, the overall models
of plea bargaining (PLEABARG) were significantly different at each
time period. Regardless of time period, however, plea concessions
were generally more common, ceteris paribus, for offenders who had
shorter criminal records and who were charged with multiple of-
fenses. The difference in the pre- and post-guideline models of plea
bargaining was primarily due to variation in the importance placed
on the county of adjudication. Plea concessions were less likely in
the two urban counties than in the other counties after passage of
the guidelines, whereas pre-guideline felons processed in Ramsey
County were significantly more likely to receive some type of plea
concession.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Many commentators have questioned the ability of reform ef-
forts to achieve their intended goals. While attacked on several
fronts, a dominant criticism of determinate sentencing is that gains
in sentencing neutrality and uniformity are easily offset by the dis-
placement of discretion and greater socio-economic differentiation
in non-regulated prosecutorial practices. It was argued here that
this presumed "hydraulic effect" should be particularly apparent
under Minnesota-like guidelines which exert rather rigid controls
over judicial discretion but are silent on the issue of prosecutorial
discretion.
Coupled with previous evaluations of the Minnesota guidelines
which report significant advances in sentencing neutrality and uni-
formity,33 the results of this study question the assumption that such
gains are eroded by greater socio-economic disparities in non-regu-
lated charging and plea bargaining practices. While different plea
bargaining models were used across pre- and post-guideline peri-
33 See, e.g., MSGC, supra note 10; Knapp, supra note 10; Miethe & Moore, supra note 3;
Moore & Miethe, supra note 10.
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TABLE 4
UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR TIME-SPECIFIC
MODELS OF SENTENCE NEGOTIATIONS AND OVERALL PLEA
BARGAINING
PBSENT
VARIABLE' 1978 1980 1982
PLEABARG
1978 1980




























































1978-80: F= 13.92,p< .00
(d.f.= 14,2627)








































































































































See the text for a discussion of the variables.
h The standard errors are in parentheses 0.
* Significant coefficient for time-specific model at p<.05; **pK.01.
+ Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of 1978
and 1980 models at p<.05; + +p<.O1.
# Significant interaction between time and attribute for comparisons of 1978
and 1982 models at p<.05; ##p<.0l.
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ods, the major contributors to these time-specific models were
changes in the direction and relative magnitude of offense and case
attributes over time. Contrary to expectations based on the hydrau-
lic effect, social differentiation in the type of persons who receive
charge and sentence concessions did not increase appreciably after
implementing the guidelines. Furthermore, while several changes
occurred over post-guideline periods, the importance of offender
characteristics remained relatively stable between 1980 and 1982.
This latter finding suggests that if criminal justice officials adapt
their practices to external changes, most adjustments were made
during the first eighteen months of the guidelines.
Given the extent to which the hydraulic effect has been em-
ployed as a criticism of determinate sentencing, several additional
analyses were undertaken to investigate whether socio-economic
disparities were suppressed in the previous analysis. For instance,
since the vast majority of the nonwhite felons came from the large
metropolitan counties, some of the variation in plea bargaining
practices over time attributed to county differences may actually re-
flect greater racial disparities.3 4 To evaluate this possibility, cases
processed in Ramsey County and Hennepin County were analyzed
separately. These county-specific models were then compared
across time periods. The slight social differentiation in charging
and plea bargaining practices observed in the aggregate models was
quite similar to that found in the county-specific models, suggesting
that our analysis did not seriously mask intra-county variation. Simi-
larly, the number of alleged offenses had a major impact on the like-
lihood of both types of charge bargaining at each time period, but
there was no indication that particular social groups were dispro-
portionately charged with multiple behavioral incidents in post-
guideline periods. These additional analyses further support our
contention that there was little circumvention of the goals of
the Minnesota sentencing guidelines through non-regulated
prosecutorial practices.
While reform efforts may exhibit some backward transference
of discretion, it is not necessarily true that prosecutors will use this
greater discretion presumably bestowed by sentencing guidelines.
In fact, although often overlooked by critics of reform efforts, sev-
eral internal and external constraints are imposed on prosecutors
and other criminal justice officials that restrict the use and abuse of
their greater discretionary powers even when sentencing guidelines
do not explicitly regulate presentence decisions. These social con-
34 See also MSGC, supra note 10, at 79.
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trol mechanisms may also explain why greater socio-economic dis-
parities in charging and plea bargaining practices did not
materialize after the sentencing guidelines were passed.
Participation in a "workgroup" or "courthouse subculture" is
an initial constraint on prosecutorial discretion. 35 Specifically, pros-
ecutors' daily working relationship with other criminal justice offi-
cials in addition to legal safeguards against unfounded prosecution
offer some control over abuses in power. Furthermore, while exter-
nal structural changes such as the implementation of sentencing
guidelines may temporarily adjust the actors' positions, membership
in this "workgroup," shared norms about the appropriate penalties
for particular crimes and system requirements (e.g., management of
workload, limited allocation of scarce resources) may also minimize
individual interests and thwart efforts by prosecutors to exercise
their greater discretionary power.
Several additional social control mechanisms may also limit
abuses of prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining
practices. For instance, the district attorneys' offices in the large
metropolitan counties in Minnesota had developed at least informal
policies concerning charging and plea bargaining practices around
the time of implementation of the sentencing guidelines.3 6 While
such self-imposed standards are not likely to eradicate all abuses in
prosecutorial power, they may nonetheless diminish the likelihood
of major adjustments in plea bargaining practices after imposition
of sentencing guidelines. Similarly, regardless of the accuracy of
such beliefs, prosecutors may perceive the development of regula-
tions on judicial discretion as an initial step in restructuring the en-
tire criminal justice system. Perceptions of subsequent control over
their discretionary power may also limit the greater use of
prosecutorial discretion. Thus, contrary to the popular view that
displaced discretion will undermine the success of sentencing guide-
lines that regulate only judicial discretion,3 7 these alternative mech-
anisms of social control will likely minimize the possibility of major
prosecutorial adjustments over previous practices even when the re-
form effort does not explicitly include prosecutorial discretion.
Although the time-specific models for various types of plea bar-
gaining do not indicate displaced discretion per se, these models do
35 See J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE (1977); A. ROSSETT & D. CRESSEY,
supra note 7.
36 See MSGC, supra note 10, at 86.
37 See generally B. Verdun-Jones & D. Cousineau, supra note 2; Alschuler, supra note 1;
Clear, Hewitt & Regoli, supra note 2; Coffee & Tonry, supra note 1.
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illustrate how prosecutors have changed their practices over time.38
Most of the specific changes, however, were not attributable to fac-
tors that are typically viewed as major enticements for entering a
guilty plea under sentencing guidelines. For instance, given that the
severity of the convicted offense is the major determinant of sen-
tencing decisions under the authority of the guidelines,3 9 changes in
initial charging practices should be observed over time. Specifically,
the average severity of initial charges should increase over post-
guideline periods if prosecutors are "overcharging" as a means of
enticing the defendant into pleading guilty to a reduced charge.
Furthermore, the severity of the initial charges and whether the case
straddled the dispositional line should have greater importance in
post-guideline decisions to reduce charges because both of these
factors can greatly effect whether a stayed prison sentence is the
presumptive disposition. However, contrary to these predictions,
the average severity of the initial charge changed little over time and
the impact of charge severity and whether the case straddled the
dispositional line actually became less dramatic in post-guideline pe-
riods. On the other hand, prosecutors may entice post-guideline
felons to plead guilty through vertical charging and increasing the
number of alleged behavioral incidents. Yet, while the number of
alleged incidents per individual increased slightly over time, this va-
riable had a less pronounced net impact on the likelihood of receiv-
ing a post-guideline charge dismissal and had similar effects across
pre- and post-guideline periods on the granting of charge
reductions.
The implications of this study can be briefly stated. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom about determinate sentencing and other
reform efforts directed at a particular component of the criminal
justice system, the results of this study suggest that the hydraulic
displacement of discretion is not inevitable and does not necessarily
dampen the success attributed to the primary reform effort. Even
38 While this analysis focuses on general changes in the nature and determinants of
charging and plea bargaining practices over pre- and post-guideline periods, subtle
changes and adaptive responses are likely to occur after the imposition of sentencing
guidelines. Unfortunately, a general modeling approach is limited in its ability to detect
and isolate these particular changes. In fact, several changes have occurred that seem
especially likely to influence plea bargaining practices in Minnesota after passage of the
guidelines. These changes include increasing the mandatory minimum for using a dan-
gerous weapon and the successive escalation of the criminal history score for each sepa-
rate behavioral incident resulting in conviction. While these changes are likely to
enhance prosecutors' bargaining power and may serve as major enticements for guilty
pleas, this study does not directly address the impact of these specific changes. For a
more complete discussion of these and other changes, see MSGC, supra note 10.
39 See MSGC, supra note 10, at 21.
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when sentencing guidelines do not explicitly regulate prosecutorial
discretion, various mechanisms of social control still operate to limit
its use and possible abuse. Initial charging and plea bargaining
practices did change after sentencing guidelines were implemented,
but greater socio-economic disparities in non-regulated
prosecutorial decisions did not circumvent the goals of sentencing
neutrality and uniformity. Thus, coupled with previous evaluations
of sentencing practices, 40 the results of this study suggest that the
Minnesota guidelines have been a successful experiment in criminal
justice reform. Whether this success can be replicated in other
states which adopt a Minnesota-like model and do not explicitly reg-
ulate prosecutorial discretion, however, remains an open question.
40 See, e.g., MSGC, supra note 10; Knapp, supra note 10; Miethe & Moore, supra note 3;
Moore & Miethe, supra note 10.
176 [Vol. 78
